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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000-

DOROTHY DERIAN d.b.a. BLACK
ROSE,
Appellee,
Appeal No. 20040869

vs.
WEST POINT CITY, Corp., a Municipal
corporation,
Appellant.

-000O000-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a judgment in a civil matter not involving domestic
relations. Plaintiffs appeal was to the Utah Supreme Court, and was transferred to
this Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) U.C.A.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant was improperly denied a renewal of her business license upon a
determination by the City that she no longer resided in her home for the purpose of
the City Home Occupation ordinance. Factual findings will be upheld if based on

substantial evidence. Clements v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 893 P.2d 1078 (Utah App.
1995). The interpretation of ordinances is a legal matter, to be reviewed for
correctness. Alliant Techsvstem. Inc. v. Tax Com'n. 2003 UT App 374, 80 P.3d 582
(Utah App. 2003). This matter was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Memorandum
on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 83-97).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES WHICH MAY
BE DISPOSITIVE
Revised Ordinances of West Point City 2000
§17-17- 2 Home Occupations. Uses classified as Home Occupations may be
allowed by conditional use permit in all zones. The following shall apply to
all major home occupations.
"(1) The use shall be conducted primarily in the dwelling site and
carried on by the inhabitants thereof and no others."
§17-17-4 General Conditions. The following conditions shall apply to all
home occupations:
"(2) the owner of the Home Occupation Business must dwell within the
dwelling."
41-la-202. U.C.A.
Definitions - Vehicles exempt from registration
Registration of vehicles after establishing residency.
(1) In this section:
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(a) ''Domicile" means the place:
(i) where an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal
establishment;
(ii) to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and
(iii)in which the individual and his family voluntarily reside, not for a
special or temporary purpose, but with the intention of making a
permanent home.
(b) (i) "Resident" means any of the following:
(A) any individual who:
(I) has established a domicile in this state;
(II) regardless of domicile, remains in this state for an
aggregate period of six months or more during any
calendar year;
(III) engages in a trade, profession, or occupation in this
state or who accepts employment in other that seasonal
work in this state ans who does not commute into the state;
(IV) declares himself to be a resident of this state for the
purpose of obtaining a driver license or motor vehicle
registration; or
(V) declares himself a resident of Utah to obtain privileges
not ordinarily extended to nonresidents, including going to
school, or placing children in school without paying
nonresident tuition fees;
3

(B) Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, firm,
corporation, association, or other entity that:
(I) maintains a main office, branch office, or warehouse
facility in this state and that bases and operates a motor
vehicle in this state; or
(II) operates a motor vehicle in intrastate transportation for
other that seasonal work.
(ii) "Resident" does not include any of the following:
(A) A member of the military temporarily stationed in Utah;
(B) an out-of-state student, as classified by the institution of
higher education, enrolled with the equivalent of seven or more
quarter hours, regardless of whether the student engages in a
trade, profession, or occupation in this state or accepts
employment in this state; and
(C) an individual domiciled in another state or a foreign country
that:
(I) is engaged in public, charitable, educational, or
religious services for a government agency or an
organization that qualifies for tax exempt status under
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3);
(II) is not compensated for services rendered other that
expense reimbursements; and
(III) is temporarily in Utah for a period not to exceed 24
4

months.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
This case arose from the denial of a business license renewal for a Home
Occupation Business by the City of West Point. A hearing was held before the City
Council which upheld the decision of the City Business License Officer not to renew
the license for the year 2004. The licensee, Mrs. Derian then filed an action in the
Second District Court contesting the City's decision. The Court, after briefing and
oral arguments on cross Motions for Summary Judgment, rendered Summary
Judgment for the City, on August 23,2004. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on
September 10, 2004. On October 12, 2004, the matter was transferred to the Court
of Appeals by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(NOTE: Plaintiff s references to the record are as numbered by the Clerk of the Court.
As to the hearing in this matter held before the City Council on February 3, 2004, the
transcript is not in proper order; and the reader may be confused by the pages being
out of order).
On or about September 9,1999 Plaintiff was awarded a conditional use permit
and a business license for a home occupation, by the West Point City Planning
5

Commission. (R. 8)
The action of the Planning Commission granted both a conditional use permit
and a business license. (R. 20).
Home occupations are licensed under §17-17-2 of the West Point City Code,
the relevant parts of which are set forth above. At the West Point City Planning
Commission hearing in September, 1999, Plaintiff described her business as follows:
Mrs. Derian explained that it is a domestic service, she explained domestic
services include serving. She explained that the girls do not do what they think
they do, they do strictly domestic services.
Mr. Lang responded to that and said what Black Rose Enterprises does is
essentially a brokerage, in that Ms. Derian as the principal of Black Rose
Enterprises, will take telephone calls or orders for the services. He said then
she has a list of independent contractors who she would then send to perform
the service. Mr. Lang said they are not employees, Mrs. Derian does not do
any withholding from their pay. Mr. Lang said her business, as a brokerage
would be done solely by her. He explained that house cleaning is performed
by independent contractors, who are based in places other than West Point and
will not be working out of Mrs. Derian's home. (R. 34-5)
At all times since September 9, 1999, the home at 1822 North 3675 West in
West Point has been owned by Dorothy Derian, and her husband. (R. 39, 57).
In the summer of 2003, Merlene Price, West Point City Business Licensing
Officer, expressed concern that someone other than Mrs. Derian made a payment on
6

utilities at the West Point City Hall, and indicated that they were living in the home
(R. 28).
Based on receiving utility payments from two people other than Mrs. Derian,
Ms. Price caused a letter to be sent indicating that the business license would not be
renewed for home occupation. Mrs. Price sent a follow up letter reiterating the City's
position on December 23, 2003 (R. 28, 40, 42).
Based on those letters, the Business License renewal was refused, an Appeal
was taken, and an Appeal Hearing was heard before the City Council, on February 3,
2004. That hearing resulted in the denial of the business license renewal(R. 54-65;
24-5).
Based on the testimony of Mrs. Derian and Mr. Stan Murdock, the City Council
entered the following Findings of Fact:
11. Mrs. Derian testified that her husband is living in Arizona and starting a
new business and that she goes to Arizona frequently for, among other reasons,
the purpose of helping her husband start the new business. She testified that
she is sometimes gone for two weeks at a time and that she spends at least six
months of each year at her home in West Point. Upon further examination she
testified that she was probably in Arizona about four or five months out of each
year and that she spent the rest of the time in her home in West Point. Mrs.
Derian testified that the dogs that she owned had been moved to Arizona. She
testified that no-one else answers the telephone in connection with the
7

operation of her business and she has telephone business calls answered on her
cell phone while she is in Arizona. She testified that she does not vote in
Arizona and does not file income tax in Arizona and has a Utah Drivers
License. She acknowledged that Cassandra Adams lived in the home for a
time, but denied that Cassandra ran the business. She testified that Mr.
Murdock is a caretaker of her home and that she reimburses him in cash for the
utility payments made by him. She denied that Mr. Murdock runs the business.
12. Stan Murdock testified that he has an arrangement with Mrs. Derian to
take care of her house while she is away and that he and his daughter have
separate living quarters in the Derian house. He testified that he does not
participate in the Derian Business.
13. The Revised Ordinances of West Point City 2000 ("Ordinances") provide
in §17-17-2(1) with respect to Home Occupation that:
"(1) The use shall be conducted primarily in the dwelling site and
carried on by the inhabitants thereof and no others."
Section 17-17-4(2) of the Ordinances with respect to all Home Occupations
states that:
"(2) the owner of the Home Occupation Business must dwell within the
dwelling."
14. By her own admission, Mrs. Derian is absent from the home for four (4)
to five (5) Months each year.
15. Mrs. Derian does not meet the Ordinance requirement that in order to carry
on a Home Occupation the use shall be carried on by the "Inhabitants thereof
and that the owner of the Home Occupation business must reside in the
dwelling. (R. 29-31).

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff s business was previously licensed by the City as a Home Occupation,
pursuant to local ordinance. The ordinance requires a person running such a business
to reside in the home. The City Council found, after a hearing, that Plaintiff did not
live in the home, as she spends a significant minority of her time at a second home in
Arizona. Plaintiff maintains that she does reside in the home, and that the question
of residence is a question of law to be determined by State law, or by a standard
deemed appropriate by this Court. Under such a standard, her residency, and her right
to retain her business license should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED THE RENEWAL OF HER HOME
BUSINESS LICENSE, AS SHE REMAINS A RESIDENT OF HER HOME, AND
RUNS HER BUSINESS FROM THERE.
Defendant argued in the trial court that "municipal land use decisions should
be upheld unless those decisions are arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal" (R.
73). Defendant claimed that the City Council made a valid land use decision, and

9

that it is the duty of the courts to uphold it. That claim is not only an oversimplification, but basically irrelevant to the actual issues between the parties.
Plaintiff has claimed that the City Council made arbitrary and capricious findings of
fact, and misapplied their own ordinance, construing the ordinance in a manner
contrary to the plain meaning of the ordinance.
The City claims the issues involve the validity of land use decisions. The
ordinance at issue, however, uses the term "conditional use permit" interchangeably
with the issuance of business licenses. In other words, the City Code appears to
create a hybrid procedure in which both a conditional use permit (a land use decision)
and a business license are granted at the same time, by the same action, as a result of
the same ordinance, and without differentiation as to where one starts and the other
stops. Plaintiff contends that the primary issue here is that of the issuance of a
business license, and not a conditional use permit. At the initial hearing in which the
license was granted, Plaintiff and her agent (Mr. Lang) set before the Planning
Commission the parameters of the business. Telephone calls were to be directed to
Mrs. Derian in her home, and she was to send out "independent contractors" to
perform services at other locations. It was not necessary, or even usual, for the
10

independent contractors to go to the home of Mrs. Derian, where the business
operations were headquartered. At the end of 2003, the City Council determined that
there had been a major shift in the operations of Mrs. Derian, and therefore the license
could not be renewed. They based that determination on testimony from several
sources that Mrs. Derian no longer resided full time in the home, but spent a
substantial minority of her time in Arizona, where her husband now resides, and
where he is attempting to start another business.
The evidence, and the Findings by the City Council, are that Mrs. Derian may
spend up to four or five months of the year outside of the home. She has someone
else in the home to take care of it when she is not there; and when she is not around
the home, she uses her cell phone to conduct the business. The uncontroverted
testimony is that she maintains ownership of the home, is registered to vote in Utah,
registers her car in Utah, and carries a Utah Drivers License.(R. 57). Mrs. Derian also
files income tax as a resident of the State of Utah, giving as her address the home in
West Point (R. 61). Based on these facts, the City Council determined that she no
longer "resides" in the home and therefore cannot maintain a home occupation. The
ordinance simply requires the home occupation business owner to reside in the home,
ii

but does not attempt to set guidelines for the residence. Plaintiff puts forth the simple
proposition that she must reside somewhere. If she does not reside in the home in
West Point, where does she reside? The "plain meaning" of the term reside, or
residence, would seem to militate in favor of the place in which she claims residency,
pays taxes, has her drivers license, registers her car, votes and spends the majority of
her time.
The Utah Code defines "resident" in several different places, depending on
usage. In §20A-1-102(62) the term is defined for voting purposes. It simply states
that a resident is "a person who resides within a specific voting precinct in Utah."
While that definition is on its own entirely worthless, it appears to define the Plaintiff
in this action. She is in fact a registered voter in the City of West Point, and must
therefore be assumed to "reside" in her voting precinct. If she did not, it appears it
would be the duty of the County Clerk to strike her from the voting roles; and the
County Clerk has not done so. There is a much better and more complete definition
in the motor vehicle code, which is set forth in full above. Once again, it appears that
Plaintiff meets all of these definitions. Clearly Plaintiff has established a fixed
permanent home and principal business establishment. If she is absent, she intends
12

to return. She resided for more than an aggregate period of 6 months or more during
the last calendar year, and thus cannot reside elsewhere. In other words, since she is
in Utah a majority of the time, she cannot be elsewhere a majority of the time, and
would not qualify to be a resident anywhere else. Thus, the finding of the City
Council that she is not a resident, makes no factual sense, and is contrary to law.
The City argues that its decision is based on substantial evidence, and that is
enough to uphold it. While the City appears to cite a valid legal standard, its decision
does not meet that standard here. In Clements v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 893 P.2d
1078(Utah App. 1995), this Court recited just that standard. The Court reviewed the
evidence in light of statutory standards concerning "domicile". Using the same
factors that have been recited already in this Memorandum, the Court found that the
Defendant was domiciled in this State. Those factors included motor vehicle
registration, ownership of real property, possession of a Utah Drivers License,
registration to vote in Utah, use of a Utah mailing address, and "an intent to remain
for an indefinite period." 893 P.2d at 1081. The contacts Plaintiff has with this State
are more than enough to show residency in the state, and in the city in which she
owns her real property, and physically spends her time.
13

The argument made by the City in this action is that this is basically a land use
decision, and the courts should not interfere with it. Defendant does not, however,
raise valid land use questions here. The purpose behind home occupation ordinances
is to allow limited business opportunities for the home owner which do not interfere
with the residential character of the neighborhood, and do not create traffic or other
problems for the neighbors. To suggest that the City is protecting its land use
interests by this arbitrary and capricious re-definition of the term "reside" is without
foundation. Certainly it attempts to impose a technologically obsolete definition of
"reside". The City seems to think that it has some interest in seeing that the telephone
calls received by Plaintiff are physically received while in the dwelling. The concept
of telephones being stationary devices maintained in the home, is no longer realistic.
Anyone and everyone conducts business in the Twenty-first century by receiving
telephone calls on their mobile or cellular telephones, as if they were in their home
or office. It is often nearly impossible for a caller to determine where the call is
received, unless that information is voluntarily given by the recipient. The City has
stated no interest, nor can it, in tying the Plaintiff down to receiving all of her
telephone calls in her home. If she spends a majority of the year in her home, she
14

qualifies as a resident. Once she qualifies as a resident, there is no legal requirement
that she imprison herself in her home. The City has therefore, in imposing a
nonsensical definition of "reside" or "resident" on Plaintiff, very clearly made an
arbitrary and capricious decision. There being no "land use" value to their decision,
it should not be upheld.
The trial Court granted Summary Judgment to the City in an order of only a
little over two pages. The portion of the Order containing its legal ruling was less
than a complete paragraph:
. . .that the legal standard to be applied to evaluate the Decision of the City
Council is to determine whether or not such Decision was arbitrary and
capricious; that the appropriate standard in connection therewith is whether or
not there is substantial evidence defined as "that quantum and quality of
evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support the Decision"; that
there is substantial evidence to support the Decision of West Point City.
Specifically, there is an Ordinance stating that the holder of a Conditional Use
Permit and Home Occupation License must reside in the dwelling. There is
substantial evidence in the record that Plaintiff lives in Arizona four or five
months a year. As a matter of law and matter of the evidence that does not
constitute a "dwelling. There was substantial evidence in the record that the
business was not conducted by the inhabitants of the dwelling as required by
City Ordinance. (R. 119).
The City has claimed from the beginning that this dispute is basically factual,
and that "substantial evidence" in support of its position is dispositive. The trial court
14

cited no law in its decision and made no attempt to explain its conclusions of law.
Plaintiff does not dispute that there is "substantial evidence" for the finding that she
does not live in the West Point home full time, 365 days per year. This finding is
substantially based on her own testimony. The trial court, however, also made a legal
ruling, defining residency: "As a matter of law and matter of the evidence that does
not constitute a "dwelling." (Emphasis added). That part of the ruling is reviewed for
correctness. Plaintiff concedes that, in Clements this Court ruled that "domicile is a
question of fact". 893 P.2d 1078, 1081. The legal standard on which such a factual
finding is based, however, is a matter of law. See Alliant Techsystem, Inc. v. Tax
Com'n. 2003 UT App 374, 80 P.3d 582 (Utah App. 2003) where the Court held that
the interpretation of a statute was a matter of law. In this case, the trial court failed
to enunciate on what law it relied to determine that Plaintiff was not using her home
as a "dwelling". The West Point ordinance contains no definition. The trial court
apparently rejected the legal definitions proffered by Plaintiff, but it did not explain
why. Nor did it explain the basis for its decision on the meaning of "dwelling" in this
instance, "as a matter of law". Certainly, the home which she owns and in which she
resides a majority of the time has many (if not all) the characteristics of a "dwelling".
15

The trial court failed to state in what way it does not qualify. Because the trial court
did not choose a legal standard, and explain why the standard sought by Plaintiff was
incorrect, the trial court made an error of law. Likewise, the City cited no law before
the trial court as to the legal meaning it claimed for "dwell within the dwelling". The
city claimed that it had a free hand to use words as it chose to do, and therefore to
make findings as it saw fit. The City of South Salt Lake made the same claim in
Petersen v. South Salt Lake, 1999 UT 93, 987 R2d 57 (Utah 1999). In that case, the
City sought to use several ordinances to prohibit an adult entertainment business from
relocating. The Court reviewed each of the ordinances, and found that the meaning
claimed by the City was incorrect. The Court, of course, reviewed the meaning of the
ordinances under the standard of "correctness". 1999 UT 93, f 2. After determining
that there was no prohibition of such a relocation, the Court dealt with the ordinance
provisions which provided for a buffer between such a business and certain of its
neighbors.

The ordinance (like the present one) contained no standard for

measurement. The Court held: "However, when a city fails to set forth the standard
for measuring the distance requirement, a court must determine what method of
measuring makes sense given 'the ends sought to be accomplished by [the
16

ordinance].'" 1999 UT 93, f 12. The Court determined that the method of
measurement used by the City was not appropriate, and then determined that, under
the correct standard, Plaintiffs business complied with the ordinance. The Court
suggested that one factor in determining a standard was the way the ordinance had
been used in the past. The City here makes no claim that the ordinance has been used
on prior occasions to close a home business when someone lived elsewhere for part
of the year. Neither did the City make a public policy argument as to the harm that
would be done to the City if Plaintiff were allowed to continue her business as she
had been doing. Plaintiff simply cannot grasp how her being away from her home for
periods of time adversely affects the "land use" policies of the City. Nobody has yet
explained it; and the trial court did not ask. Enforcing the ordinance as sought here
by the City is truly an example of arbitrary and capricious government action, done
without standards, and without a check on the power of the governmental entity. The
question should not be whether there was "substantial evidence" to support the
decision of the City, but whether it was made on the basis of a clear and valid
standard. Since it wasn't, it should be reversed.
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. allows for summary judgment when "there is no genuine
17

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." The person against whom the Summary Judgment Motion is filed, is
entitled to all the inferences fairly arising from the facts, considered in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Wine gar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104
(Utah 1991). Plaintiff is a resident of the City of West Point, and of the home she
owns in that City., within legal definitions promulgated by the Utah Legislature.
Absent a clear contrary legal standard which specifically applies to this situation,
Defendant is not entitled to Summary Judgment, because of the inferences in
Plaintiffs favor.
CONCLUSION
The trial court used an incorrect legal standard to review the actions of West
Point City. Summary Judgment must be based not only on a finding that there is
substantial evidence to support the City Council's findings, but that a correct legal
standard was used. Because an incorrect legal standard was used, this Court must
decide what law to apply to the facts; and that legal standard must "make sense".
Plaintiff believes that such a procedure will result in a reversal of the judgment, and
the reinstatement of her business license.
18

DATED this

lay of March, 2005.
W. ANDRE^MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the O

~ day of March, 2005,1 did mail two true

and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to Felshaw
King, Attorney for Appellee, 330 North Main Street, Kaysville, Utah 84037.
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FELSHAW KING, Esquire (1818)
KING & KING
Attorneys for West Point City
P. O. Box 320
330 North Main Street
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Telephone: (801)543-2288
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

DOROTHY DERIAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 040600824
Judge Thomas L. Kay

WEST POINT CITY,
Defendant.
ooOoo

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, July 28, 2004 before
the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Judge. The hearing was held upon Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and upon
Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff appeared by and through her
Attorney W. Andrew McCullough, Esq. and Defendant appeared by and through its Attorney
Felshaw King, Esq. After having reviewed said Motions and the other files and pleadings
herein and after having heard the arguments of Counsel the Court did find that no evidence
*
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outside the record created at the hearing before the City Council could be considered; that
the legal standard to be applied to evaluate the Decision of the City Council is to determine
whether or not such Decision was arbitrary and capricious; that the appropriate standard in
connection therewith is whether or not there is substantial evidence defined as "that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support the
Decision"; that there is substantial evidence to support the Decision of West Point City.
Specifically, there is an Ordinance stating that the holder of a Conditional Use Permit and
Home Occupation Business License must reside in the dwelling. There is substantial
evidence in the record that Plaintiff lives in Arizona four or five months a year. As a matter
of law and matter of the evidence that does not constitute "dwelling". There was substantial
evidence in the record that the business was not conducted by the inhabitants of the dwelling
as required by City Ordinance.
Based upon the files and records herein the Court finds that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that as a matter of law Defendant is entitled Summary Judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiffs
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby DENIED.
DATED this £fejday of August, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

THOMAS IUCAY
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on August 11,2004, I caused to be mailed,
pursuant to the terms of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct
copy of the proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
W. Andrew McCullough, Esq.
McCullough & Associates, L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
6885 South State Street, Suite 200
Midvale, Utah 84047
DATED this 11th day of August, 2004.

Secretary
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/ quality-checked all previous work and finished your order according to the instructions
on the Order Envelope.
Senior Project Coordinator:
/ quality-checked the final product using FedEx Kinko's quality standards and the
instructions on the Order Envelope. To the best of my knowledge, this order meets your
expectations.
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